These Notes from the Road are based on the DGAP team’s trip to Kyiv in April, including attending the Kyiv Security Forum (20-24 April). During the trip, we held meetings and interviews with think tanks, civil society, and officials, focusing on the domestic situation, security, and the EU accession process.  

Foreign Policy and Security  

Compared to the situation during the last DGAP trip in the autumn of 2025, the United States’ focus on Iran has reduced fears that Ukraine will be pushed into a bad peace deal with Russia. There is no expectation of an early end to the war; people are preparing for it to go on for at least another year. In one poll, 48% of respondents said they expected it to conclude in 2027, and 38% pointed to the second half of 2027 or later. There is a clear understanding that Russia has no interest in ending the war. At the same time, Ukrainians are not ready to give up on the occupied territories and understand that the war is not about Donbas but about Ukraine’s survival.  

Ukrainians would accept a formula without NATO troops on the ground, but they want financial commitments and credible security guarantees. They do not see a peace deal without security guarantees as a real one. At the same time, with the breakthroughs in middle- and long-range drone technology, Ukraine feels more self-confident to negotiate with the EU on enlargement and security cooperation.  

There is a broad understanding that the United States has stepped back. There are fears that it will loosen sanctions and re-establish business ties with Russia.  The government’s clear priority is to maintain a working relationship with Washington, while it tries to prepare for a worst-case scenario.

The EU and Accession Process  

The coming summer will be crucial for both sides in terms of enlargement. After the recent change of government in Hungary and the opening of the first accession cluster, the months up to France’s presidential election in April 2027 are seen as a window of opportunity for enlargement that could close after. There is a sense of urgency to lock Ukraine into the enlargement process. The country’s accession is in many ways a special case for the EU and its member states, as it is also linked to security, as the relationship is transforming into something closer to a military alliance with shared interests. Accession is increasingly seen as necessary for both sides, including for integrating Ukraine into the reformed European defense framework. 

The ten priorities in the “Kachka-Kos” plan provide a road map for Ukraine’s reforms, but little has happened in concrete terms, and civil society is very vocal about the need to deliver. Civil society is seen as critical for both the enlargement and the functioning of the state: people expect it to address problems quickly when they arise, and also to take an active role in government oversight.  

The proposal by Germany’s Chancellor Friedrich Merz for Ukraine to be initially offered associate membership in the EU is criticized in Ukraine, since this has been understood as an alternative to full membership. Furthermore, the term is confusing since Ukraine already has an Association Agreement with the EU. Ukraine needs a clear commitment and clear perspective for its EU membership. 

Energy and Domestic Policy  

Discussions are ongoing on how to prepare Kyiv for the next one if conditions are equally harsh again, and how to ensure that the capital’s infrastructure can be repaired and maintained. These debates are fueled by tensions between Mayor Vitali Klitschko and President Volodymyr Zelenskyy as well as by arguments about financing, which will undermine the preparations for next winter in the capital. 

Preparing for the next winter is the central question, particularly for Kyiv. Russian attacks have knocked out 9 gigawatts of electricity generation capacity across the country. All power plants, apart from nuclear ones, have been damaged or destroyed. Discussions are underway about how to balance the energy market and how to repair and replace equipment, but mobile cogeneration solutions are difficult to scale. A fully decentralized energy system is not feasible for a city the size of Kyiv, and there is no clear plan yet for how to prepare the capital for winter. There have been 127 incidents at nuclear power stations recorded since the start of the full-scale war. 

The Servant of the People party’s trust has been broken between the parliament faction and the President’s team. The Servant of the People majority exists on paper, but in practice, every law requires negotiations and consultation. Members of parliament are no longer willing to rubber-stamp everything coming from the president’s office, but they also lack the cohesion to act independently.  

Demographics and the Economy 

The size of the population appears to be stable, but a lot will depend on what happens next, especially in the winter. The population currently stands at around 30 million (down from 41 million before the war) with a birth rate of 0.9. Around 43% of those abroad say they might be willing to return, while around 36% are not likely to, but all depends on the security situation. If the trends related to population decline do not change, the demographic impact will be irreversible by 2030. The narrative has started to shift from how to bring people back to how to engage with those who may never return: what skills they have, how to maintain ties, and how to channel their contributions in support of Ukraine.  

The main division in society is between those who are on the front line and those who are not. This will play a major role after the war too. 

High unemployment persists. People are not re-skilling, and fear of conscription is preventing many from entering the formal labor market. Companies are being pushed out of the shadow economy, in part because designations as critical infrastructure require formalization, but this also means a higher tax burden for them. Foreign direct investment is almost non-existent. 

Companies operating near the front line enjoy higher protection for their employees from the military draft than others, creating an incentive for them not to relocate. More companies are being designated as critical infrastructure, compounding this dynamic. 

China could be barred from participating directly in the reconstruction process after the war. There is a clear message from officials that it will not be invited to do so. Türkiye is very present, with construction companies already active in the country. 

Anastasia Pociumban, Stefan Meister, Mario Baumann, DGAP