"What’s Brewing in the Eastern Neighborhood?" brings timely questions to a panel of experts, sparking dynamic debate and showcasing a range of perspectives on the issues shaping the region.

In this edition, we asked experts to assess the foreign policy and domestic governance priorities of the newly elected Armenian government. They also share their expectations and the scenarios most likely to unfold.

Arpy Manusyan is the President and Researcher at “Socioscope” Research Center

Armenia’s parliamentary elections were held on June 7, 2026. According to the final turnout data, 58.97 percent of eligible voters participated in the election, a significant increase from 2021. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party secured a parliamentary majority, while two opposition forces, Strong Armenia and the Armenia Alliance –both pro-Russian and oligarchic actors with substantial financial, media, and political resources – also won seats in parliament. Whether these opposition forces will ultimately fulfill their mandates remains unclear to date.

Over the next five years, Armenia is likely to continue pursuing regional normalization with Azerbaijan and Türkiye, while debates on security, peace, and geopolitical orientation will remain central to political life. Yet, the key challenge for Armenian democracy may not be the direction of foreign policy itself, but the limited checks and balances surrounding it. Whether in parliament or beyond, political competition is likely to remain shaped more by geopolitical alignments than by substantive debates on governance, public policy, and reform.

As a result, there is a risk that domestic governance and human rights issues receive less scrutiny. Democratic legitimacy cannot be sustained through foreign policy achievements alone. It ultimately depends on accountable institutions, effective governance, and social justice. At the same time, Armenia faces the risk of a shrinking space for healthy political and public debate. In increasingly polarized environments, criticism is often judged not by its substance but by who voices it and whom it may benefit politically. Combined with persistent disinformation, media manipulation, and efforts to exploit public fears and frustrations, these trends risk deepening polarization and weakening trust in democratic institutions.

This places particular responsibility on civil society, independent media, and intellectuals. During periods of geopolitical uncertainty, democratic actors are often tempted to mute criticism for fear of empowering anti-democratic opponents. Yet, Armenia has long passed this point. Anti-democratic forces have strengthened their parliamentary presence and will continue to play a significant role in political life.  Thus, over the next five years, Armenian civil society will need to resist both complacency and polarization. It must continue to defend democratic institutions against internal authoritarian tendencies.

The strength of Armenia’s democracy will ultimately depend not only on its institutions, but on the quality of its public sphere: one that remains independent enough to challenge those in power, resilient enough to resist anti-democratic pressures, and open enough to rebuild trust, dialogue, and democratic participation beyond the logic of permanent political confrontation.

Tigran Grigoryan is the Director at the Regional Center for Democracy and Security

Nikol Pashinyan’s government, with its renewed mandate, will be defined by how it translates political continuity into a clearer, more coherent strategic agenda while managing a highly constrained regional and domestic environment.

On the policy side, a central priority should be the continuation and deepening of Armenia’s diversification agenda. This includes not only geopolitical diversification, but also economic and trade diversification through: the search for new markets, raising the standards and competitiveness of domestic production to meet international requirements, and reducing dependence on Russia across key economic and strategic sectors. In parallel, energy diversification will remain critical, including the need to take a final decision on the construction of a new nuclear power plant and move toward implementation.

Another key area is comprehensive military reform. While the modernization of weaponry is an important component of defense transformation, the more consequential task lies in institutional change – reshaping the culture of the armed forces, improving professional military education, strengthening accountability mechanisms, and building more effective command structures.

The government will also need to maintain momentum on European integration. This includes advancing implementation of the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) framework, deepening regulatory and sectoral alignment with the European Union, and sustaining progress on the visa liberalization dialogue. These processes are increasingly central not only to institutional reform, but also to broader economic modernization, export capacity, and long-term external anchoring.

The rapid implementation of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) project and the broader unblocking of regional communications will remain a strategic priority with both economic and geopolitical implications.

In this context, Iran emerges as an important external actor whose concerns regarding regional connectivity projects such as TRIPP will require careful and calibrated diplomatic management.

At the same time, the government will face significant external constraints. Managing Russia’s increasingly assertive and often coercive posture will remain a central challenge, particularly as Armenia seeks to reduce dependence on Russia in key economic, energy, and security domains. Azerbaijan’s continued refusal to sign a peace treaty further complicates the regional picture, blocking broader normalization processes, including full Armenia-Turkey normalization and border opening.

Domestically, democratic backsliding remains a serious concern. The ruling party’s increasing reliance on administrative and legal instruments for political purposes risks weakening institutional trust and undermining the resilience of Armenia’s democratic system over the long term.

Sona Ayvazyan is the Executive Director at the Transparency International Anticorruption Center 

Armenia’s parliamentary elections of 7 June 2026 have concluded. While the elections were competitive and dynamic, they were also marked by significant foreign interference, vote-buying, instances of administrative resource abuse, and other violations.

The election results are currently being recounted, and errors are being corrected. Greater clarity regarding the composition of the new parliament is expected in the coming days. It is already certain, however, that the incumbent Civic Contract party has secured the stable majority required to form a government unilaterally.

The other parties that have passed the electoral threshold are those that were endorsed by the Kremlin. Should they choose to continue the confrontational and obstructive style of opposition politics that characterized the 2021 to 2026 parliament, it may significantly hinder the ruling party’s ability to advance its democratic and sovereignty-focused agenda.

Among the most important and urgent tasks facing the new parliament and government are the following:

1. Restore social cohesion and internal solidarity within Armenian society. The highly polarized election campaign further deepened divisions within society. Harsh, inflammatory, and discriminatory rhetoric employed by senior politicians against their opponents is widely replicated by ordinary citizens, contributing to the normalization of intolerance and hostility. This trend poses serious risks to social cohesion and undermines the country’s resilience in the face of security challenges.
2. Restore public trust in the justice system. This requires accelerating the implementation of justice-sector reforms, including in the areas of anti-corruption, the judiciary, and law enforcement. Progress should go beyond legislative amendments and include concrete improvements in practice, such as addressing selective and disproportionate enforcement of laws and the excessive use of pretrial detention as a preventive measure.
3. Initiate inclusive public discussions and consensus-building on constitutional reform. Constitutional reform is essential for strengthening democratic governance, improving checks and balances, and enhancing the protection of human rights. At the same time, meaningful reform requires broad public and political support. Under current procedures, organizing a constitutional referendum requires the support of at least two-thirds of parliamentarians. For constitutional amendments to be adopted, at least 25 percent of eligible voters must participate in the referendum, and more than half of participating citizens must vote in favor.
4. Launch amendments to electoral and related legislation. Several of the shortcomings observed during the recent parliamentary elections stem from gaps in the legal framework. An urgent priority for the new government should therefore be to strengthen safeguards against foreign interference, improve transparency in political party financing, introduce restrictions on third-party funding, and build up measures to prevent the misuse of administrative resources. A range of other technical improvements to electoral legislation should also be considered.