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Moldova Navigating a Transition: A New Prime Minister, Domestic Situation, and EU Accession
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Moldova Navigating a Transition: A New Prime Minister, Domestic Situation, and EU Accession

These Notes from the Road are based on Anastasia Pociumban’s trip to Chisinau in July 2026. The visit included meetings with experts and civil society.

 

Domestic Situation  

In recent weeks, Moldova has been heavily impacted by scandals related to opaque appointments public institutions and high salaries for people linked or appointed by the Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) governing party. The head of Moldatsa – the state enterprise responsible for the use of Moldova’s airspace and the provision of air-navigation services – was found to have falsified his diploma and to have employed his lover on a high salary; he himself earned around €5,500 per month (while an average salary in Moldova is around 800 euro) He was revealed to have falsely written in his CV that he got a pilot license in Canada and had worked for two years as a pilot for Air Canada. Additionally, Moldatsa had hired as a communications expert Anastasia Taburceanu, who had worked previously as spokesperson for Prime Minister Natalia Gavrilita and is President Maia Sandu’s cousin. Taburceanu, employed since June 2025, earned on average around €3,700 per month and additionally was providing consultancy services for the government, financed by the EU. Following the media investigations, she resigned from Moldatsa and returned the money she had earned from the company. This has raised broader questions regarding the transparency of appointments under the PAS government, and also about the sustainability of external financing for governmental positions – as it creates discrepancies between public servants and external contractors with much higher pay.  

This also prompted further investigations into Moldatsa and people detained; as well as an audit of salaries in the public institutions. However, the scandals might further erode the credibility of PAS and their reform promises. 

Prime Minister Alexandru Munteanu, and therefore his government, resigned on July 3. His resignation was not so much linked to the scandals themselves; rather, the scandals and the launch of a widely criticized fiscal reform provided a convenient occasion for him to leave, as his resignation had been discussed for a while. As prime minister, Munteanu was not meeting the expectations of the PAS and the population. 

 

New Prime Minister and Government 

The new prime minister, Vasile Tofan, comes from the business sphere. He has extensive corporate experience in Moldova and Ukraine, but no political background. His program is economically very liberal, aiming to make Moldova highly attractive for entrepreneurs and businesses. He has written extensively about public administration reform, arguing that the country needs a much more radical approach. However, since his appointment, he has said that the current, and quite controversial, reform is too far advanced to backtrack. He has reappointed all ministers but four from the former cabinet.  

Overall, there are mixed feelings about the new government. Many experts and civil society members would have preferred a more political prime minister, but the PAS seemingly lacks the personnel that would fit the profile and agree on doing it. Many noted that Tofan’s task will be highly challenging; aside from potential disagreements with his agenda among the government, he is an outsider who will struggle to push reforms through.  

However, Tofan seems dynamic and committed to continuing the audits in public institutions related to salaries and appointments. People who know him say that he might be able to adapt to the demands of the prime minister’s job, and also that he is able to engage with a wide range of actors, including opposition parties.  

 

EU Accession 

Moldova’s civil society is divided. There is a debate on how to keep the government accountable without creating more pretexts for Russian interference, which remains an active threat. Many people feel the EU is too lenient with the government on reform progress. Meanwhile, the government’s narrative is that it is better to enter the EU first, given the tight time frame and current momentum, and deal with domestic issues later. So, while many from civil society share the vision of joining the EU, they are concerned about hasty reforms and processes that are not consultative. 

Regarding Transnistrian region and country reintegration, the new government's strategy echoes the previous administration's vision, with key personnel remaining unchanged. It focuses on economic convergence, gradual reintegration, with the goal to maintain peace and stability. It includes the previously discussed convergence fund – that intends to utilize revenue collected from VAT and excise duties that will be gradually applied to companies in the Transnistrian region, matching the system currently in place on the right bank. The fund will start operating on 1 January 2027 and aims to support development projects on the left bank of the river, though its exact operational mechanisms remain unclear. 

Anastasia Pociumban

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