"What’s Brewing in the Eastern Neighborhood?" brings timely questions to a panel of experts, sparking dynamic debate and showcasing a range of perspectives on the issues shaping the region. 

In this edition, we asked experts to share their views from Kyiv, Chisinau, Brussels, Berlin, and Paris, and their expectations for the EU enlargement process in 2026. The discussion centers around two questions: 1. What are the expected political, institutional, and strategic outcomes from enlargement in 2026? and 2. How can the enlargement policy remain credible?

Dmytro Shulga, Perspective from Kyiv  

Dmytro Shulga is the European Programme Director at the International Renaissance Foundation (IRF). 

The leaked “accession light” concept – to accept Ukraine as a new member without waiting for full compliance with all acquis - radically accelerated the EU enlargement methodology discussion. It aims to break out the likely Western Balkan-style deadlock under the current methodology. For Ukraine, accession to the EU is seen as part of broader security guarantees that need to come immediately after the war ends, not after many more years of limbo. A Member State will have more chances for investments and economic development sufficient to sustain an army capable of credible defense in the future. At the same time, Ukraine faces serious institutional challenges in adopting acquis (especially, the capacity of its parliament). Hence, a compromise “creative solution” to quickly bring Ukraine to the table as a member has been conceptualized; Namely, give it voting rights in the Council only where and when it complies with the acquis. Interestingly, the Ukrainian press (Evropeyska Pravda) reports that it was actually the idea of European leaders when they joined the Ukrainian-American negotiations last summer. Despite this, the concept seems to be a surprise for everyone, and it’s not clear whether the EU will be seriously considering this option.  

Either via this or another accession methodology, the Ukrainian government and businesses will need to effectively reach out to Member States, especially on agriculture issues, to minimize fears of interest groups in Member States. Potential fiscal and market impacts tend to be quite exaggerated and often politicized, without understanding Ukrainian realities. For example, few know that the number of farmers as producers theoretically eligible for EU subsidies in Ukraine would be 10 or even more times less than in Poland. Or that the total agricultural export of “giant” Ukraine is almost 3 times less than that of Belgium. And, for most products, Ukrainian producers hardly compete with Member States – and where they do, this needs to be turned into partnerships and value chains integration. Ideally, however, all this debate would not concentrate only on costs and fears but increasingly also on the opportunities for the EU. With so much talk about European competitiveness, Ukraine has a real potential to contribute in many areas, such as from raw materials to agriculture, (military) industry, IT, energy, transport, and even the environment. Ukraine as a “big country” means not only big challenges when accessing to the EU but also big opportunities – strategic, political, and also economic. 

Mihai Mogildea, Perspective from Chisinau  

Mihai Mogildea is a Deputy Director at the Institute for European Policies and Reforms (IPRE). 

In 2026, the EU enlargement process will depend on the political will and strategic vision of its 28 Member States. If Hungary’s veto on opening Ukraine’s accession negotiations by individual clusters becomes a thing of the past, the key question will be whether EU capitals have sufficient support and determination to ensure the accession process is predictable and sustainable for candidate countries. 

At the political level, Cyprus and Ireland, as holders of the Council Presidency, are likely to keep enlargement high on the EU agenda. This could lead EU institutions to unanimously reinforce accession negotiations by endorsing provisional chapter closures on a merit-based basis, as well as offering staged access to different policies and programs related to the EU single market, education, energy, and security. The latest aspects should be properly envisaged in the EU Multiannual Financial Framework 2028-2034, providing more opportunities for the accession countries based on the genuine perspective of integrating them in the EU. Instruments like Growth Plans for accession countries should be further enhanced to create economic convergence and adapted to the needs of societies. 

Enlargement can remain credible only if systemic actions are developed to keep it as a key priority in Brussels and EU capitals. In terms of political discourse, this policy should be coupled with the EU’s ambitions to properly ensure its own defence and security. Accession countries are not a buffer zone, but rather strategic partners in a fragmented and unpredictable world order.

Perspectives from Brussels 

A view from Tinatin Akhvlediani  

Tinatin Akhvlediani is a Research Fellow in the EU Foreign Policy Unit at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS). 

Looking ahead to 2026, the EU enlargement process is likely to advance, but with varying momentum across different countries. On the Western Balkans front, it is realistic to expect Montenegro and Albania to make substantial progress, potentially nearing to close key accession chapters by 2027. Assuming, of course, that EU Member States maintain the political will to reward measurable reforms, allowing these frontrunners to move ahead without facing their resistance.  

On the Eastern flank, the trajectory is far less certain. Hungary’s veto – influenced by domestic politics and the upcoming spring elections – remains the critical factor. If the veto persists, the most likely outcome is carrying on with so-called “frontloading”: Ukraine and Moldova will continue implementing reforms regardless of Hungary's veto, making progress undeniable and ultimately compelling the EU to act swiftly once the veto is lifted. For the remaining candidate countries, however, substantial movement is unlikely. Many still fall short of EU requirements and show little readiness to accelerate reforms in line with membership criteria. 

For enlargement to remain credible, the EU must combine consistency in both conditionality and reward. When frontrunners deliver tangible reforms, the Union must be prepared to respond promptly, in its own “merit-based” approach. North Macedonia already demonstrates how momentum can be eroded: persistent bilateral disputes with EU Member States and repeated vetoes have stalled its progress, showing how internal divisions within the EU can undermine reform incentives in its candidate countries.  

At the same time, conditionality must be rigorously applied when countries diverge from commitments, with Georgia and Serbia serving as prominent examples. Kosovo’s unresolved status continues to strain its accession prospects, leaving the country in a prolonged state of uncertainty. Redefining the EU’s relationship with Turkey would also strengthen credibility: while Ankara remains formally in the enlargement basket, it is effectively treated as a strategic partner, and clarifying the nature of that partnership is essential. 

Ultimately, credibility rests on the EU demonstrating that it can both reward progress and enforce its conditionality consistently. Without this, enlargement risks losing its strategic and political weight, leaving aspirants caught between ambition and frustration. 

A view from Amanda Paul  

Amanda Paul is a Deputy Head of Europe in the World Programme and a Senior Policy Analyst at the European Policy Centre (EPC). 

EU leaders are weighing up expedited enlargement, potentially admitting Ukraine and other candidates before many of the usual requirements have been met. Referred to as “reverse enlargement,” it reflects the new reality: the post-1945 rules-based order is in tatters, with hard power returning to the center of geopolitics, and that security in Europe can no longer be taken for granted. In this environment, enlarging the EU must be a strategic security imperative. 

Long term European security is directly linked to the war in Ukraine, and EU membership must form an integral and robust part of any ceasefire arrangement. Four years into Russia’s War of Aggression, Kyiv’s integration into the EU is inseparable from Europe’s security, credibility, and resilience. Fast-tracking Ukraine and other states – which are ready to fully align with EU norms – is not only the morally right thing to do, it is strategically necessary. 

Yet, speedy membership should not mean second-class membership. There must be a clear, credible, and effective transitional process. Provisional measures and processes should not become permanent as it could result in a scenario in which Ukraine would risks being bound by EU rules and market obligations without playing a role in decision-making.  This would leave Kyiv politically and economically vulnerable, which would almost bring about political and public frustration The EU must also redouble efforts to forge consensus on its own enlargement readiness by moving ahead with crucial internal reforms that are necessary to have an effectively functioning EU of 30 or more members. This will require difficult changes and choices, but if the EU is to be a relevant and effective geopolitical actor, it must begin to act like one. EU enlargement is a major test – not only of candidates’ commitment but of Europe’s strategic vision: something the EU has fallen short of having time and time again. Now is the moment to reverse that trend. 

Funda Tekin, Perspective from Berlin 

Funda Tekin is the Director at the Institute für Europäische Politik (IEP) and Honorary Professor at the Universität Tübingen. 

Three trends determine the EU’s enlargement policy in 2026. First, debates do not shy away from discussing concrete dates. The aim is to finalize accession negotiations with Montenegro by the end of 2026. If Ukraine’s accession became part of a peace deal, the suggestion would be to fast-track the country’s integration into the EU by the end of 2027. Second, considerations on alternatives to full integration have returned to the table – “reversed enlargement” being an extreme and contested form. Third, while privileged partnership has long been a non-starter among candidate countries, by now they themselves are thinking out loud about participation on levels below full membership. This all reflects the fact that obstacles to the EU’s enlargement remain high due to the unanimity requirement and veto players among EU Member States.  

Germany is fully aware of the geopolitical push for enlargement while putting an emphasis on the accession procedure’s merit-based approach. The government’s coalition agreement clearly links the EU’s enlargement to institutional reforms. Transitory periods in accession treaties are considered a credible way of preserving the rule of law. In political terms, delivering on finalizing accession negotiations with Montenegro would be a low-hanging fruit that the EU should not miss picking. In institutional and strategic terms, finding a clear-cut and specified model for a flexibilization of the accession procedure and forms of association below membership should be the aim for 2026. The mood has rarely been so perceptive for such a debate. For enlargement to remain credible, this does not necessarily imply reversing the accession procedure by selling EU membership below its worth. Clear criteria should guide both the accession procedure and membership. Finally, when thinking about enlargement, in addition to looking southeast, one should also look north. 

Laure Delcour, Perspective from Paris 

Laure Delcour is an Associate Professor at the Sorbonne Nouvelle University in Paris. 

Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, France’s position on EU enlargement has shifted from reluctance to discursive support. The authorities started framing enlargement as a security imperative, while also insisting on the fact that accession should be merit-based and that EU institutional governance should be reformed prior to new accession rounds. In 2026, the French position is likely to remain cautious as a result of two intertwined factors. First, within the EU, French citizens are the least supportive of new accessions: just 43 percent support further enlargement, while 48 percent oppose it, voicing concerns over uncontrolled migration, corruption and organized crime, costs for EU taxpayers, and increased complexity of EU decision-making (Eurobarometer, 2025). Second, the forthcoming presidential elections and subsequent parliamentary elections (May-June 2027) may bring to power political forces that openly oppose EU enlargement and more broadly challenge EU integration. These two factors are especially crucial in light of the French ratification modalities for new EU accessions; As per constitutional changes introduced in the 2000s, a referendum is the rule unless it is bypassed by a three-fifths majority vote in both chambers of Parliament, which is unlikely in the current political context. In 2026, the current French authorities are therefore likely to maintain rhetorical support for enlargement while closely monitoring reforms in the candidate countries, especially with respect to the fundamentals.

As regards accession as a merit-based process, France favors staged integration, with additional financial, policy, and institutional benefits being gradually offered to candidate countries to incentivize reforms. France also pushes for an enhanced integration of security in the accession process, an element that matters crucially for several candidate countries. As France opposes fixed timelines for forthcoming accessions, moving explicitly towards gradual integration with clear stages and benchmarks, and bolstering the security dimension of accession are regarded as key steps to maintain the credibility of enlargement.