"What’s Brewing in the Eastern Neighborhood?" brings timely questions to a panel of experts, sparking dynamic debate and showcasing a range of perspectives on the issues shaping the region.

In this edition, we asked experts to assess what the results of the Hungarian elections mean for Ukraine and the EU enlargement, from the perspectives of Hungary-Ukraine relations, the rule of law and decision-making in the EU. 

Zsuzsanna Végh is a Program Officer at the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF)

The defeat of Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz Party in the April 12, 2026, parliamentary election opens the door to a reset in Hungary’s strained relationship with Ukraine. While Péter Magyar’s victory does not mean a pro-Ukrainian turn, it forecasts a break with Fidesz’s confrontational and hostile attitude that often favored Russian interests. The new Magyar government will likely pursue a more pragmatic and collaborative approach grounded in Hungary’s national interests. 

A central issue Magyar will want to address on the bilateral agenda is the resolution of the decade-long dispute with Kyiv over the rights – especially language use and education – of the ethnic Hungarian minority in Ukraine’s Transcarpathia region. While this issue has been instrumentalized by the Fidesz government, a less politicized approach could reduce friction if paired with genuine dialogue. Tisza’s foreign-minister- designate, Anita Orbán, cites Poland and Romania as examples that managed to resolve their minority concerns in Ukraine. 

Energy will represent another key file. Hungary’s continued reliance on Russian oil delivered via the Druzhba pipeline – transiting Ukrainian territory – creates dependencies that cannot be ignored. Restarting transit will likely be an early priority for Magyar, even as Tisza’s party program signals a longer-term commitment to diversification. 

Domestic public opinion also constrains the scope for rapid rapprochement. Years of government propaganda have contributed to decreasing solidarity toward Ukraine and a negative Hungarian perception of both the country and of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. A recent poll by Policy Solutions shows that as of 2025, 71 percent of the population have negative views of Ukraine, and 64 percent of President Zelenskyy. Yet these attitudes are not deeply rooted historically, which may leave room for gradual improvement. 

In sum, a Magyar victory will not transform Hungary into a staunch Ukrainian ally. It, however, allows for cautious pragmatism – creating space for incremental normalization of the bilateral relationship that has long been hijacked by the Orbán government’s political interests. 

András Rácz is a Senior Fellow of the Security and Defense Program of the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)

On April 12, 2026, Viktor Orbán suffered a decisive defeat in the Hungarian parliamentary elections. While the official final results are yet to be announced, it is already clear that Orbán’s Fidesz Party has not only lost its constitutional majority in the parliament, but the opposition Tisza Party – led by Péter Magyar – has won a new constitutional majority. The new government is likely to be inaugurated in early May. 

In terms of foreign policy, the key priority of Péter Magyar will be to normalize relations with the European Union. Doing so will be crucially important in order to regain access to the EU funds, worth approximately thirty-five billion Euros, that have been suspended since 2022 due to rule of law concerns in Hungary. This core objective will also shape all other directions of Magyar's foreign policy, which will be directed by a committed Transatlanticist expert and former diplomat, Dr. Anita Orbán (unrelated to Viktor Orbán). 

The change of power in Budapest is also going to open a new chapter in Hungary-Ukraine relations. The new Hungarian government is highly likely to stop vetoing the ninety billion Euros EU loan to Ukraine almost immediately after the inauguration. Budapest will also abandon its obstructive veto policy that has hampered Ukraine’s accession negotiations with the EU. 

The key priority of the new Hungarian government vis-à-vis Ukraine will be to ensure the respect of language and education-related rights of the ethnic Hungarian minority living in the Zakarpattya region of Ukraine. Kyiv is apparently willing to respond positively, as reflected already by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyi’s demonstrative visit to Zakarpattya a few days ahead of the Hungarian elections, as well as by Ukraine’s readiness to swiftly complete the repairs of the crucially important Druzhba oil pipeline that was damaged late January in a Russian air strike. While Hungary will continue to refrain from providing Ukraine with any direct military support, the mutual goodwill to defuse tensions inherited from the Orbán-government era forecasts a new, much more cooperative era in Ukraine-Hungary relations. 

Jakub Jaraczewski is a Senior Research Coordinator at Democracy Reporting International (DRI)

The victory of Peter Magyar heralds a significant change in Hungary’s policy towards both the EU and Ukraine. The cornerstones of Viktor Orban’s foreign relations – his ongoing conflicts with EU institutions and his close friendship with Vladimir Putin’s Russia – are about to dissipate. While this means a sea change in Hungary’s relationship with Brussels and Kyiv it’s unlikely the new government will embrace a completely pro-EU, pro-Ukraine stance. We can expect a reversal of the Hungarian veto on the EU’s 90 billion Euros loan to Ukraine, but Magyar has already signalled that he will not endorse fast-tracking Ukrainian membership in the bloc. Similarly, while relations with the EU will improve significantly, the new Hungarian government will likely be assertive on migration, energy, and agriculture. But these disagreements will remain within the EU mainstream, rather than form an obstruction. 

As for the rule of law, Hungary faces many challenges similar to those in Poland, including entrenched institutions, politically captured courts, and officials appointed to key roles by the formerly ruling Fidesz Party, along with the added hurdles of an Orban-era constitution and a permanent state of emergency that resulted in de facto rule by decree. A key difference is that Magyar’s Tisza Party won a constitutional supermajority, allowing it to reshape the country’s constitutional order. With such an opportunity, the question for Peter Magyar becomes how to prioritize reforms. Several key judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights await implementation, and more are to come very soon, as European courts will resume the lull in deciding Hungarian cases due to elections. A key challenge for Magyar will be to move these items in a way that leads the European Commission to unlock the funds withheld from Hungary, a crucial factor that could enable his economic reform plans. 

Anastasia Pociumban is a Research Fellow and Project Manager at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)

Péter Magyar’s Tisza Party winning the Hungarian parliamentary elections marks the end of Viktor Orbán’s 16-year rule, a period which is defined by significant democratic backsliding, erosion of judicial independence and rule of law, and obstructing the European Union’s foreign policy. Recent leaks further confirmed that Orbán’s government acted in Russian interests and closely cooperated with the Kremlin. This includes blocking the EU’s ninety billion Euros loan to Ukraine, preventing the opening of Ukraine’s EU accession negotiation chapters, and using the blockage of sanctions packages, particularly related to energy as a bargaining chip.  

A Tisza-led government is welcome news for both the EU and Ukraine, but it should be treated with cautious optimism. On Ukraine financing, a new government would likely unblock EU loan disbursements that Kyiv urgently needs. On EU accession, Hungary under Magyar might lift its veto on officially opening negotiations clusters – which means that the first accession cluster can be opened for Ukraine, as well as Moldova, already under the Cyprus Presidency – as both countries are coupled and have started the technical work on all clusters through frontloading.   

The Hungarian government will also focus on the question of minority rights under fundamentals in the case of Ukraine. However, the new government is unlikely to lead on the idea of the geopolitical enlargement process for Ukraine or advocate for EU internal reform. It will rather support a merit-based approach under the current framework. Furthermore, after years of Orbán’s anti-Ukraine and anti-enlargement messaging, Hungarian public opinion remains skeptical, and reversing that sentiment will take time, plus might be unproductive at the beginning of the term.   

Beyond Hungary, a change in the government’s position regarding Ukraine in Budapest would also expose those Member States that have been hiding behind the Hungarian veto and their own reservations about Ukraine’s EU accession. A Tisza victory does not resolve the fundamental question of Ukraine’s accession model, which, given the ongoing war with Russia, may require a special framework distinct from the approach applied to other candidate countries.